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A Game Model of Optimal Apartment Cleaning by College 
Students 
Abstract 
 In this note we use a static game model to analyze the optimal cleanup of an apartment 
that is shared by two college students. Both students dislike cleaning. However, they also prefer 
a clean apartment to a dirty one. Student ݅′ݏ utility function embodies the idea that the more time 
one student spends cleaning, the less valuable is the time spent cleaning by the other student. In 
this setting, we first determine the best response function of each student (player) ݅ where 
݅ ൌ 1,2. Second, we determine the cleaning time choices that survive one round of the iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS). Finally, we ascertain the cleaning time 
choices that survive all rounds of IESDS.  
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1. Introduction 
 Readers who have been college students in the United States will know that such students 
frequently spend their first (freshman) and sometimes their second (sophomore) year living in 
dormitories. However, after the completion of their sophomore year, these students often shift to 
either an on-campus or to an off-campus apartment. In some institutions of higher learning, quite 
apart from a desire for greater independence on the part of the students, such a move is mandated 
by the fact that the relevant institution is able to guarantee housing only to a fraction of all 
enrolled students.3 
Dormitory living in most institutions generally does not involve any noteworthy cleaning 
activities on the part of the students because custodial staff are standardly present to take care of 
most cleaning activities. However, this state of affairs clearly changes once students move into 
their own apartments. In this new living arrangement, the cleanliness of a shared apartment 
depends ultimately on the time spent by the individual students in keeping this apartment clean. 
The available evidence shows without any ambiguity that students sharing apartments 
frequently get into conflicts because of a variety of reasons, not the least of which is their 
heterogeneous preferences for cleanliness.4 Thus, it is no surprise that tales about the putative 
disadvantages of living either with “neatfreaks” or with “slobs” are legion in American popular 
culture. Departments of residential life and housing in institutions of higher learning routinely 
counsel students about the ways in which they can avert conflicts arising from misunderstood or 
poorly defined apartment cleaning chores. Therefore, the problem of the apposite division of 
responsibilities for cleaning a shared apartment is both commonplace and relevant. 
                                                            
3 
See Tietjen (2015) for additional details on this point and for a listing of the dormitory capacities of a number of different 
institutions of higher learning in the United States. 
4 
See Ogletree et al. (2005, 2006) and Yadegaran (2013a, 2013b) for a more elaborate corroboration of this claim. 
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To the best of our knowledge, Batabyal (2016) is the only paper to have formally studied 
aspects of the apartment cleanup problem that we have just referred to. Specifically, Batabyal 
(2016) analyzes a static game model of apartment cleaning and determines the Nash equilibrium 
cleanup times in the optimal apartment cleaning game. The analysis in the present note also 
involves the study of a static game model of optimal apartment cleaning but our focus is on 
strictly dominated strategies and on the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies 
(IESDS). 
Specifically, we use a static game of complete information5 model to analyze the optimal 
cleanup of an apartment that is shared by two college students. Both students dislike cleaning. 
However, they also prefer a clean apartment to a dirty one. Student ݅′ݏ utility function captures 
the idea that the more time one student spends cleaning, the less valuable is the time spent 
cleaning by the other student. Section 2.1 describes the static game model we utilize to conduct 
the analysis. Section 2.2 determines the best response function of each student (player) ݅ where 
݅ ൌ 1,2. Section 2.3 ascertains the cleaning time choices that survive one round of IESDS. In 
section 2.4, we investigate the cleaning time choices that survive all rounds of IESDS. Section 3 
concludes and then offers two suggestions for extending the research described in this note. 
2. Analysis 
2.1. The game model 
 Consider a scenario in which two college students share an apartment. Student ݅, where 
݅ ൌ 1,2, selects a non-negative amount of time ߬ ൒ 0 to clean the apartment under study. If we 
denote the cleaning time choices of the two students by ߬௜ ൒ 0 and ௝߬ ൒ 0 then student ݅′ݏ 
concave utility function is given by  
                                                            
5 
See Gibbons (1992, pp. 1-54) or Tadelis (2013, pp. 43-128) for textbook expositions of static games of complete information.  
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௜ܷ൫߬௜, ௝߬൯ ൌ ൫10 െ ௝߬൯߬௜ െ ߬௜ଶ.     (1) 
 
 Two points are now worth stressing. First, our choice of the positive real number 10 in 
equation (1) simplifies the ensuing mathematical analysis we undertake. It is, for all practical 
purposes, without loss of generality. In this regard, we emphasize that an analysis of the sort we 
undertake in this note can be conducted for any positive real number.  
Second, consistent with the discussion in section 1, the particular form of the utility 
function in equation (1) is designed to succinctly capture the following idea that we believe is 
salient in the context of apartment cleaning by college students: the more time one student 
spends cleaning, the less valuable is the time spent cleaning by the other student. Therefore, if 
we were to replace equation (1) with ௜ܷ൫߬௜, ௝߬൯ ൌ ሺ10 ൅ ௝߬ െ ߬௜ሻ߬௜ then this latter function would 
not capture the above idea. In this regard, the reader should not interpret the utility function in 
equation (1) as saying that the ݅ݐ݄ student obtains disutility from the time spent cleaning by the 
݆ݐ݄ student.6 Given this background, our next task is to determine the best response function of 
student (player) ݅ where ݅ ൌ 1,2.  
2.2. The best response function 
 We begin by maximizing student ݅′ݏ utility function in equation (1), given his belief 
about the time spent cleaning by the other player or ௝߬. Specifically, the ݅ݐ݄ student solves 
 
݉ܽݔሼఛ೔ஹ଴ሽሼ൫10 െ ௝߬൯߬௜ െ ߬௜ଶሽ.     (2) 
 
                                                            
6  
One way to extend the analysis in this note would be to work with the utility function ௜ܷ൫߬௜, ௝߬൯ ൌ ൫ܣ௜ ൅ ௝߬ െ ߬௜൯߬௜ where ܣ௜ is a 
student specific parameter.  
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The first order necessary condition for a maximum is7 
 
10 െ ௝߬ െ 2߬௜ ൌ 0,       (3) 
 
which implies that student ݅′ݏ best response function is 
 
߬௜ ൌ ଵ଴ିఛೕଶ .        (4) 
 
Which cleaning time choices by the two students survive one round of IESDS? We now proceed 
to answer this question. 
2.3. Choices surviving one round of IESDS 
 Suppose student ݅ chooses ߬௜ ൌ 5. Given that student ݆ selects ௝߬ , the utility to the ݅ݐ݄ 
student from the choice of ߬௜ ൌ 5 is 
 
௜ܷ൫5, ௝߬൯ ൌ 5൫10 െ ௝߬൯ െ 25 ൌ 25 െ 5 ௝߬.    (5) 
 
Now suppose that student ݅ chooses 5 ൅ ߳ where ߳ ൐ 0. If student ݆ selects ௝߬ then the utility to 
student ݅ from this choice is  
 
௜ܷ൫5 ൅ ߳, ௝߬൯ ൌ ሺ5 ൅ ߳ሻ൫10 െ ௝߬൯ െ ሺ5 ൅ ߳ሻଶ ൌ 25 െ 5 ௝߬ െ ߳ଶ െ ߳ ௝߬.  (6) 
 
                                                            
7 
The reader can check to see that the second order sufficiency condition is satisfied. 
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Since ߳ ൐ 0, inspecting the right-hand-sides (RHSs) of equations (5) and (6), it follows that 
 
௜ܷ൫5, ௝߬൯ ൐ ௜ܷ൫5 ൅ ߳, ௝߬൯.      (7) 
 
 The discussion in the preceding paragraph tells us that given the belief that student ݆ 
selects ௝߬ , the choice of ߬௜ ൌ 5 is a best response to ௝߬ ൌ 0. In turn, this tells us that any cleaning 
time choice ߬௜ ൐ 5 is strictly dominated by ߬௜ ൌ 5. Summing up, we see that the cleaning time 
choices ߬௜ ∈ ሾ0, 5ሿ are the ones that survive one round of IESDS. We now proceed to our final 
task and that is to determine the cleaning time choices that survive all rounds of IESDS. 
2.4. Choices surviving all rounds of IESDS 
 We begin by pointing out that the IESDS solution concept is attractive because it does 
not require the existence of a strictly dominant strategy and nor does it require the existence of 
strictly dominated strategies. Now, to accomplish the task before us, we follow the methodology 
discussed in Tadelis (2013, pp. 65-67). Note that in the second round of the process of 
elimination, because ߬ଶ ൑ 5, the best response function ߬௜ ൌ ሺ10 െ ௝߬ሻ 2⁄ ---see equation (4)---
implies that student 1 will choose ߬ଵ ൒ 2.5 and a similar symmetric argument applies to student 
2. This tells us that the strategy sets that survive the second round of the elimination of strictly 
dominated strategies are ߬௜ ∈ ሾ2.5, 5ሿ for ݅ ൌ 1,2.  
 If this elimination process were to converge to an interval and not to a single point in the 
respective strategy sets then by symmetry between the two students, the interval of interest 
would be some ሾ߬௠௜௡, ߬௠௔௫ሿ that simultaneously satisfies two equations in two unknowns that 
are given by 
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߬௠௜௡ ൌ ଵ଴ିఛ೘ೌೣଶ 	ܽ݊݀	߬௠௔௫ ൌ
ଵ଴ିఛ೘೔೙
ଶ .    (8) 
 
Having said this, it is straightforward to verify that the only solution to the two equations in (8) is 
߬௠௜௡ ൌ ߬௠௔௫ ൌ 10 3.⁄  Therefore, we deduce that the unique pair of cleaning time choices by the 
two students that survive all rounds of IESDS is given by 
 
߬ଵ ൌ ߬ଶ ൌ ଵ଴ଷ .       (9) 
 
When the cleaning times chosen by the two students are in accordance with equation (9), 
straightforward substitution in equation (1) shows that the ݅ݐ݄ student’s maximized utility is 
௜ܷሺ10 3, 10 3ሻ ൌ 100 9.⁄⁄⁄  This completes our game-theoretic analysis of the optimal cleaning 
of an apartment shared by two college students. 
3. Conclusions 
 In this note we used a static game model to analyze the optimal cleanup of an apartment 
that was shared by two college students. Both students disliked cleaning. However, they also 
preferred a clean apartment to a dirty one. Student ݅′ݏ utility function embodied the idea that the 
more time one student spent cleaning, the less valuable was the time spent cleaning by the other 
student. In this setting, we first determined the best response function of each student or player ݅ 
where ݅ ൌ 1,2. Second, we determined the cleaning time choices that survived one round of 
IESDS. Finally, we ascertained the cleaning time choices that survived all rounds of IESDS. 
 The analysis in this note can be extended in a number of different directions. Along with 
footnote 6, here are three suggestions for extending the research described here. First, it would be 
useful to introduce different degrees of aversion to cleaning on the part of the students in the 
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model and then analyze scenarios in which it is possible for one student to make side payments 
to the other to avoid cleaning duties. Second, in a dynamic and stochastic setting, it would be 
helpful to see if the two students are able to come up with a cleaning schedule that is 
renegotiation-proof. Finally, it would also be interesting to analyze the apartment cleaning 
problem when the two agents under consideration are either domestic partners or spouses. 
Studies of apartment cleaning and, more generally, the performance of necessary chores by busy 
college students and other agents that incorporate these aspects of the problem into the analysis 
will provide additional insights into a time allocation problem that has important economic and 
social ramifications for young people.  
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